Journal of Hindu-Christian Studies
Volume 31 Celebrating Rāmānuja at 1000: The
Heritage and Promise of the Study of Rāmānuja
in a Christian-Hindu Comparative Theology

Article 20

2018

The God of Love and the Love of God: Thinking With Rāmānuja
R m nuja
About Grace in Augustinian Christianity
Ankur Barua
Cambridge University

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.butler.edu/jhcs

Recommended Citation
Barua, Ankur (2018) "The God of Love and the Love of God: Thinking With Rāmānuja About Grace in
Augustinian Christianity," Journal of Hindu-Christian Studies: Vol. 31, Article 20.
Available at: https://doi.org/10.7825/2164-6279.1697

The Journal of Hindu-Christian Studies is a publication of the Society for Hindu-Christian Studies. The digital
version is made available by Digital Commons @ Butler University. For questions about the Journal or the Society,
please contact cbauman@butler.edu. For more information about Digital Commons @ Butler University, please
contact digitalscholarship@butler.edu.

Barua: The God of Love and the Love of God: Thinking With R?m?nuja About

The God of Love and the Love of God:
Thinking With Rāmānuja About Grace
in Augustinian Christianity
Ankur Barua
Cambridge University
ABSTRACT: Rāmānuja’s exegetical-theological
struggles with the question as to whether his
doctrine that the Lord Viṣṇu-Nārāyaṇa is the
inner controller of the finite self dissolves
moral autonomy remind us of one of the most
vexed debates in Augustinian Christian
theology – whether divine grace infallibly
moves the predetermined soul to perform
virtuous action, or whether divine grace is
rendered efficacious by free human response.
I suggest that Christian systematic theologians
can profitably explore Rāmānuja’s integration
of an emphasis on divine grace with an
affirmation of human autonomy in his
devotional universe.
I begin with a deep theological paradox
that structures the doctrinal systems of
Christianity and various forms of devotional
Vaiṣṇava Hinduisms – the simultaneous
affirmation of divine sovereignty and human
volitional response. On the one hand, God is

not restricted in any way by the worldly
structures over which God exercises sovereign
control – a scriptural declaration which could
suggest that human volitions too are
subsumed into, and even negated by, divine
agency. On the other hand, however, the
uncoerced response of human beings to the
divine self-revelation is regarded as a pivotal
moment in their progressive overcoming of
worldly imperfections. A survey of the
religious histories of Christianity and
Vaiṣṇava Vedānta indicates a series of
polarised groups who have taken up
embattled positions by highlighting one of
these two theses over the other – for instance,
the Ariminians versus the Calvinists, or Martin
Luther versus Desiderius Erasmus in one
context, and the Tengalais versus the
Vaḍagalais in another. Our purpose in this
essay is threefold: first, to highlight
Rāmānuja’s attempts to hold together the two
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‘moments’ of the Lord’s gracious help offered
to the devotee and also the active response of
the devotee; second, to indicate the contours
of an Augustinian Christian resolution of this
theological paradox; and third, to offer some
reflections on what Christian theologians
could learn through an engagement with
Rāmānuja’s understanding of the divine
presence. As we will see, the doctrine of
production of the world and the doctrine of
divine favour are mutually interrelated across
Vaiṣṇava Hindu and Augustinian universes.
For the later Augustine (411–430 CE), the key
theological note is the utter incapability of
human beings, who have a single lifetime on
earth, to initiate even the first turn towards
God, and he concludes that for those saints
who are timelessly foreordained to receive
salvation this initial conversio itself is
prepared by God’s grace. In Rāmānuja, on the
other hand, we do not encounter such
theological anxieties relating to a specific
temporally-locatable moment – certain
human beings, through the fruition of their
beginningless (anādi) stream of karmic merits,
are beginning to move in this lifetime towards
the Lord Viṣṇu-Nārāyaṇa who is constantly
assisting them in their spiritual endeavours.
The Either/Or dichotomy between ‘divine
grace’ versus ‘human autonomy’ which
appears with sharp contrasts in Augustine
and, following him, in the Reformed doctrinal
systems of theologians such as Calvin, is
largely
absent
from
Rāmānuja’s
understanding of how structured human
response and divine favour are mutually
intertwined in the human spiritual
pilgrimage.
(A)
The theological system of Rāmānuja,
which intertwines dense layers of scriptural
exegesis, reasoned discourse, and devotional
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experience, is structured by a dynamic
polarity between divine transcendence over
the world and divine accessibility to human
interiority. The creative tension between
‘transcendence’ and ‘immanence’ that
Rāmānuja works with appears pointedly in the
topic of whether his doctrine that the Lord
Viṣṇu-Nārāyaṇa is the inner controller
(antaryāmī) of the finite self dissolves human
moral autonomy. According to Rāmānuja’s
distinctive understanding of the term ‘body’
(śarīra), it is any substance which a conscious
being is capable of completely controlling and
supporting for its own purposes, and whose
essential form (svarūpa) is to be the accessory
of that being.1 Since the finite self, thus
encompassed in the body (śarīra) of the Lord,
is said to be controlled by the Lord, this
immanent control would seem to threaten its
moral autonomy.2 Rāmānuja replies that the
Lord has equipped individuals with the
instruments necessary for performing action
(such as the organs of speech, the power of
thought and willing) and remains within them
as their support and inner controller, while
with the help of these capacities individuals
either perform or desist from action. We may
take the analogous case of a carpenter who has
at hand the necessary implements such as an
axe but uses them only when they wish to
work. We must at the same time, however,
recognise the limitation of this analogy for
while the carpenter is necessarily extrinsic to
the tools used at work, the Lord resides within
the embodied self as its inner controller in a
way that does not take away its moral agency.
When the finite self chooses to perform a
certain act, the Lord, the embodied self’s
metaphysical support, consents to its
fulfilment, and without such permission
(anumati) no action is possible. In the final
analysis, we must affirm both that the Lord is
the ultimate cause behind every action and
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that nevertheless the finite self remains a
moral agent. Thus, commenting on the
scriptural text which states that it is the Lord
who causes those whom the Lord wishes to
lead upwards or downwards to perform good
or bad actions respectively (Kauṣītaki
Upaniṣad III, 8), Rāmānuja argues that the Lord
favours those who perform actions as
devotional worship and produces in them the
desire (ruci) to perform more virtuous actions,
while on the other hand, the Lord produces in
those who are intent on violating the divine
commands the desire to perform non-virtuous
actions which will further hinder their
progress towards the Lord.3 Therefore, in this
case too the progress or the regress of the
embodied self towards or away from the Lord
is a consequence of its own prior actions for
which it remains morally responsible.
However, although all embodied selves
are embraced by the divine body, not all of
them are moving towards the Lord, and many
are, in fact, overwhelmed with the burden of
their past karma in the present life-time. It is
only by withdrawing itself from the
impermanence of the mutable prākṛtic world,
including that of its own body, that the finite
self gradually becomes more con-centrated in
itself, and by realising its essential nature as
the accessory (śeṣa) to the Lord it begins to see
the whole phenomenal world as an unbroken
reality pervaded by the Lord. In this process,
by seeking refuge (prapaddi) in the Lord
whose body it constitutes, it begins to perform
all actions with the knowledge that it is the
Lord who is the supreme agent behind them.4
While the way back to the Lord through the
perils of saṃsāra is not ‘predestined’ in a
strong Augustinian-Calvinist sense, according
to which certain individuals are timelessly
elected to receive salvation, neither must it be
understood as a ‘Pelagian’ self-striving
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unaided by the Lord, for Rāmānuja explains
that only they whom the Lord chooses obtain
the supreme goal, and the Lord strives to bring
them, who are His beloved, to Him. Rāmānuja
clearly states in one place in the
Vedārthasaṃgraha that release from saṃsāra
is not possible without resort to the supreme
Lord.5 Regarding the supreme lovers of the
Lord, the jñānins, Rāmānuja writes that it is
the Lord Himself who chooses them and grants
(dadāti) them the capacity to progress in their
worship by removing from them all the
obstacles that hinder the further increase of
their devotion towards Himself.6
The Kaṭha Upanisad I, 2, 23 is the basic
scriptural text on which Rāmānuja builds his
theology of the Lord’s grace (prasāda), which
assists the embodied self on its journey
towards liberation. Rāmānuja states that it
declares that it is not possible for the finite self
to attain the Lord through the mere hearing of
scripture, reflection on it and meditation on it,
for only they who have been chosen by the
Lord shall obtain this supreme end, which is
Himself. These ‘chosen’ people are beloved of
the Lord, and it is the Lord Himself who strives
to bring them to Him. Because of His favour,
they begin to acquire a direct presentation of
the Lord in their minds, and this is a steady
remembrance dear above all things since the
object of this remembrance is of such a nature.
Such a steady remembrance of the Lord in
those whom He has chosen is called devotion,
and for Rāmānuja this is synonymous with
worshipful meditation (upāsana). While the
devotee’s meditative worship of the Lord is the
cause of the devotee’s being chosen by the
Lord, this worshipful ‘remembrance’ itself is
aided by the Lord’s gracious choosing of the
devotee.7 The devotees who seek the Lord
alone will acquire moral qualities, perform
‘good works’ as forms of worship, and through
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devotion become absorbed in incessantly
glorifying Him. They become completely
dedicated to the most compassionate
(paramakāruṇika-) Lord by taking refuge at
His lotus-feet (śaraṇāgati-), and are assisted by
His grace (prasāda) which dispels their
ignorance. Thus, they are able to attain Him
through their fervent devotion (bhakti) to
Him.8 The supreme person, the reliever of the
distress of supplicants, has stepped into the
world out of supreme compassion and
parental love for His devotees so that He may
become a refuge for all.9 By seeking refuge
(prapad-) in the Lord who will enable the
selves to overcome their ignorance about the
spiritual nature of the finite self, they shall be
able to perform all actions easily until they
attain perfection through His grace
(prasāda).10
(B)
Rāmānuja thus presents Visnu as the
supremely adorable deity who is the
transcendental abode of all supereminent
qualities, and who, as the inner controller
(antaryāmī) in the embodied human self, is
also intimately accessible to the devotee. J. B.
Carman notes that a similar motif of a
transcendent God who condescends to the
depths of sinful humanity lies at the core of
the theologies of various Christian figures, and
writes: ‘We can feel in Christian faith the same
tension that Rāmānuja senses in his
apprehension of the Lord revealed to him in
the Vedas and through the Vedānta and the
Śrī Vaiṣṇava tradition. That tension is the
inner dynamic of the supreme lordship and
utter availability within the same Divine
nature and the same Divine person. That is
why, although Christians stand outside
Rāmānuja’s tradition, they are able to grasp
and appreciate so much of his thought.’11 Thus,
Rāmānuja’s exegetical-theological struggles
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with the central theological paradox – of
simultaneously affirming divine sovereignty
and human freedom – can illuminate one of
the most vexed debates in Christian theology,
namely, whether divine grace infallibly moves
the predestined soul to perform virtuous
action, or whether divine grace is rendered
efficacious by free human response. As a
matter of fact, Rāmānuja’s own Śrī-Vaiṣṇava
community split into two traditions after his
death over the question of whether (a)
Rāmānuja had primarily outlined a structured
system of human karmic responses to the
Lord’s gracious initiative or (b) Rāmānuja had
advocated the complete renunciation of
human agential capacity (prapatti) in the
wake of the Lord’s offer of grace (prasāda) to
worldly beings as an independent means
towards final renunciation.12 Rāmānuja
himself sought, as we have seen, to hold
together two theses which also lie at the
doctrinal core of the mainstream Christian
traditions: (a) while human beings must
(actively) work out their salvation in ‘fear and
trembling’ (Philippians 2: 12); (b) without their
(passive) reception of divine grace, they are
incapable of seeking and finding God (John 5:
15).
What is distinctive about the Augustinian
Christian theological problematic is a series of
interlocking theses about divine atemporal
eternity, the (utter) bondage of the human will
due to original sin, and the divine timeless
foreknowledge of human responses to God.
The famous Augustinian resolution of
numerous theological paradoxes is that the
predestined are timelessly chosen not because
they have already turned to God but in order
that they may believe in the future.13
Predestination, which is the timeless God’s
(fore-)knowledge of what God is going to do, is
therefore a preparation for grace (gratia),
which follows as its effect.14 The eternal God
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does not have to wait upon the created order
in any manner and timelessly (fore-)knows
those saints who will be resurrected into
eternal life after the final judgement. God
(fore-)knows the whole created order of
causes in the universe and since the free
choices of human beings, which are the causes
of their specific actions, are themselves
encompassed by this order, God timelessly
(fore-)knows all their future actions in a
manner that does not destroy their free
agency. For example, when we (‘freely’) pray
to God and God has mercy on us, it does not
imply that God is now acting on some new
motive in response to a temporal event (that
is, our praying); rather, God timelessly
(fore)knows that we shall, as a matter of fact,
offer our prayers. Therefore, while Augustine
asserts that human beings must make an
active response to the divine offer, he also
emphasises that the fact that God timelessly
(fore-)knows that some of them shall in fact
make this response does not detract from their
free moral agency.15 However, although by
being baptised into the body of Christ,
predestined individuals have indeed entered a
new existential state, their regeneration is not
yet complete, and they are exhorted to
constantly renew ‘the inner man’ (2
Corinthians 4 : 16), while they wait, with hope,
for the redemption of their bodies at the
resurrection. In other words, Christians
cannot slacken their efforts for even though it
is the Spirit of God who is constantly leading
them towards holiness, it is they themselves
who must do the running. Thus, Augustine
declares in a sermon that God is building up a
temple with Christians as stones, but they are
not dead pieces of matter to be passively
thrown about but rather are ‘living stones’
who must actively cooperate with God in this
construction.16 Therefore, the saints who have
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been timelessly predestined to receive saving
grace are not coerced but are inclined to come
to Christ for their wills have been ‘prepared’
by grace, and they are drawn to Christ in a
manner that does not annihilate their free
choice of will. A child who loves nuts will come
running to a person who is offering them, this
very love giving the child the strength to run;
similarly, God has shaped the hearts of the
elect to love God, and God sweetly appeals to
these saints to accept the divine offer.17 The
omniscient
God
has
the
timeless
(fore)knowledge of what human beings will
freely choose to do under which conditions,
and by presenting the elect with specifically
those inclinations and motives that God
(fore)knows to be congruent with their
circumstances, God brings them to become
faithful and holy.18
(C)
While Augustine did not – as it is
sometimes claimed – deny that human beings
have free will (liberum arbitrium), by
insisting, however, that the temporal
beginning (initium) of faith itself is a gift of
God, he bequeathed to Christendom a question
of momentous proportions: is the will’s first
movement towards God founded on its own
(natural) resources or is this return
foreordained within God’s (supernatural)
gracious economy? While Rāmānuja’s
devotional universe too is shaped by the
simultaneous assertion of divine control and
human autonomy, the pointed Augustinian
question does not arise on his horizons partly
because these are shaped by the doctrine of
karma and rebirth, which operate in a
beginningless (anādi) universe. Even if people
following the discipline of works do not attain
liberation in this birth, they will regain in the
subsequent birth the mental disposition with
which they have been performing actions in
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this birth. Consequently, like someone who
has just woken up from sleep, they will carry
on from where they had left off and strive once
again for complete success.19 Thus, since the
cycles of re-embodiment do not have a
temporal origination, the vexed theme – one
volatile source of Christian divisions during
and after the European Reformation – relating
to the spiritual dynamics of the first moment
does not appear in Rāmānuja’s theological
commentaries. Rather, divine gracious
presence
and
human
agency
are
beginninglessly so densely entangled that
they cannot be neatly separated.20 In the
Augustinian worldview, in contrast, there is
no ‘before’ to the present lifetime, so that the
question of whether the first turning towards
God is directed by human effort or inspired by
divine grace becomes a vexed conundrum. The
former possibility would seem to negate
Christ’s saying, ‘Without me ye can do
nothing’ (John 25:5), which is constantly used
by Augustine as one of his proof-texts for the
necessity of grace as a divine aid (adiutorium
Dei). The second possibility would invoke the
spectre of a theological determinism where
human volition is drawn to God with an
‘irresistible’ compulsion. This dilemma clearly
shapes Augustine’s exegetical struggles with
Biblical data such as God’s love of Jacob and
hatred of Esau (Malachi 1:2-3: Romans 9:13)
even before the twin brothers were born, from
within his Christian framework of a linear
symbolism of time according to which human
beings have only one life on earth. Rāmānuja,
however, would argue that the various
inequalities (mental, socio-economic, moral
dispositions, and so on) that we see in the
phenomenal world are, on the one hand, not
predetermined by the Lord in an Augustinian
sense, and are, on the other hand, not random
happenings either. Because of the
beginningless nature of the stream of karma
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he can maintain that the empirical
distinctions in each new world-order are a
recompense for the non-annihilated karma,
handed over from the previous ones, of finite
beings.21
What, then, might Christian theologians
learn through a careful exploration of
Rāmānuja’s theological terrain? The doctrine
of creation ex nihilo is sometimes understood
as teaching the world’s temporal origination,
which only foregrounds the vexed question:
which arrives first, unmerited divine grace or
free human response? In some sectors of
Catholic doctrine, the world is placed under
the sign of a ‘pure nature’, which is then
sharply contrasted in an extrinsic sense with
the subsequently superadded dimension of
the ‘grace’ of divine creativity. Because nature
is regarded as a self-sufficient realm that is not
‘always already’ orientated towards God, grace
appears as an external superstructure which is
imposed on the former, with the implication
that until an individual experiences grace
through the verbal revelation preached by the
Church, she remains locked into a state of pure
nature.22 Such an understanding of creation ex
nihilo motivates the claim that an initial state
of the corrupted human will, belonging to a
pure nature, is succeeded by divine grace,
which generates the extremely subtle – and
seemingly
interminable
–
scholastic
disquisitions on the temporal relation
between divine foreknowledge of future
contingents and human responses. However,
if the doctrine of creation is instead read as
emphasising the utter
metaphysicalexistential dependence of the world on Christ,
it could shift the theological focus away from
a temporal priority of grace over freewill (or
vice versa), towards a mystical priority of
grace which ineffably ‘encapsulates’ human
agency.23 Cyril Veliath, S.J. writes in this vein
that the ‘antinomy that exists between the
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agency of the individual Atman and that of the
Brahman … stands a better chance of
acceptance when observed not from a
metaphysical but from a Mystical point of
view.… When viewed from such a perspective
therefore, it is of little consequence to
consider whether the agent be the Atman or
the Brahman, for in the ultimate perspective
there is nothing else but the Brahman, and any
individual that the Atman may possess is
wholly due to the Brahman alone …’24 Veliath’s
view is echoed more recently by Martin
Ganeri, O.P. who writes that the polarities of
divine grace and free will in Rāmānuja are ‘to
some extent … the common ones that abide in
such theistic accounts in many traditions and
mark the limits of human reason to make
sense of realities that transcend them’.25
To understand the themes of ‘mystical’
and ‘polarity’ in this context, we may highlight
two radically distinct types of distinction
which are involved in the vexed debates
relating to divine grace and human response.
On the one hand, we observe various forms of
empirical distinctions in the everyday world
between, say, these chairs and those tables,
one chair here and another chair there, and
one book yesterday and the same book today.
On the other hand, the ‘distinction’ between
God and the world cannot be spelled out in this
manner in terms of spatio-temporal relations,
for God is not another object who stands in
contradistinction to the world: God is beingitself who is the ground of the world’s
existence at every moment. Therefore, the
‘distinction’ between God and the human
devotee should not be viewed in terms of two
(quasi-finite) individuals – one, a faultless
grandmaster and another, a paltry novice –
who are competing with each other to weave
a carpet from two opposite ends. Such
‘synergistic’ images invoke dilemmas such as:
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‘If the novice abandons all self-effort, how can
the novice progress towards perfection? But if
the novice does not abandon all self-effort,
would not this assertion of autonomy be an
affront to the sovereignty of the master?’ Such
metaphors, in effect, domesticate divine
transcendence, and lead to the perception that
divine sovereignty is related to human
freedom in a ‘zero-sum game’ such that
highlighting the former can only entail the
negation of the latter.26 The way through this
dilemma is to remind ourselves that God and
the world are not related as two ‘distinct’
enumerable powers in the sense that one
entity – the grandmaster – works with another
isolable entity – the novice, but in the sense
that the one ineffable reality of the creator
God mystically envelopes, encapsulates, and
encompasses the finite being of the world to
which God remains graciously bound in
relations of polarity. While a distinct temporal
origination (say, 14 billion years ago) has often
been associated with creation ex nihilo, it has
also been argued that the core of this doctrine
is, in truth, the notion of existential
dependence of the world on God.27 In this
understanding, then, God is ‘prior’ to the
world not primarily in a temporal sense but in
the ontological sense that God remains the
gracious fund of being who sustains human
beings on their return to their transcendental
home.
In the light of our discussion, we may turn
to the Congregatio de Auxiliis which was
established by Pope Clement VIII (1597) to
examine the highly scholastic debates
between the Dominicans and the Jesuits: they
furiously disputed the point whether grace is
efficacious because of the nature of grace itself
or because of divine (timeless) omniscience of
how human beings would respond to offered
graces.28 Finally, Pope Paul V (1607) gave his
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decision not by stating what the Roman
Catholic position is but by sketching the
contours of what it is not – thus, the Jesuits are
not ‘Pelagians’, the Dominicans are not
‘Calvinists’, and each side should cease to
slander the other as heretics. The Pope’s
apophatic via media could be seen as an
assertion of the ‘mystical’ priority of God’s
providential care over human response – in a

manner that cannot be comprehended
through logical categories, the former does
not erase but effectuates the latter. If
Rāmānuja had been invited by the Pope as a
religious observer to the Quirinal on this
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